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**PRI AND THE BEYOND MERIDA INITIATIVE**

**by**

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

**Signature: \_\_\_\_\_**

**28 October 2011**

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## **Abstract**

The rapidly evolving and highly volatile situation along the U.S. / Mexico border continuously requires both countries to devote precious resources to this region. If not controlled, the damage from unrestrained immigration, drug trafficking, and violence could be devastating to both countries. The Merida Initiative, which has framed bilateral border security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico since 2007, is evolving in response to this threat. Its successor, framed as Beyond Merida, proposes a new focus along with associated resources. Concurrently, the Government of Mexico (GOM) will likely change as a result of the 2012 Mexican national election. The imminent changes in both Beyond Merida and the GOM warrant an examination. By analyzing the central tenets of Beyond Merida and comparing them to the current and future political situation in Mexico, this paper shows that the election will have little or no adverse effect on Beyond Merida. Then, drawing on lessons learned from current operations, this paper recommends methods to monitor the ongoing effect the GOM has on Beyond Merida.

*“I believe the Merida Initiative has placed us on the road to success in terms of the strong U.S. commitment to shared responsibility in countering the threat from transnational criminal organizations in North America.”<sup>1</sup>*

*- General Charles Jacoby, USA  
Commander, USNORTHCOM*

## **INTRODUCTION**

While international relations are the purview of the State Department, the Department of Defense clearly plays a supporting role. Bilateral agreements that involve the promised commitment of military personnel, expertise, and equipment require military input. Therefore, the military’s involvement in bilateral or international affairs cannot be accomplished in a vacuum. Careful consideration must be made of the context in which military support will be provided. In international relations, this context is often political, both domestic and foreign.

The rapidly evolving and highly volatile situation along the U.S. / Mexico border continuously requires both countries to devote precious resources to this region. If not controlled, the damage from unrestrained immigration, drug trafficking, and violence could be devastating to both countries. The Merida Initiative, which has framed bilateral border security cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico since 2007, is evolving in response to this threat. Its successor, framed as Beyond Merida, proposes a new focus along with associated resources. Concurrently, the Government of Mexico (GOM) will likely change as a result of the 2012 Mexican national election. The imminent changes in both Beyond Merida and the GOM warrant an examination.

Given the volatile history of Mexican politics and political parties, and the expected results of the 2012 presidential election, one would expect that the prospects for Beyond Merida

could be in question. However, analyzing the future components of Beyond Merida provides clarity of its transformation from a military to an economic and law enforcement centric aid package. This shift increases its potential political viability. Digging deeper into the political landscape of Mexico and its parties, especially the expected victor, provides political motivations that likely overlap with Beyond Merida's intent. Comparing these two analyses provides clues to the future of Beyond Merida in Mexico's political landscape. This comparison shows that the expected results of the 2012 Mexican National election will not significantly affect the future of the Merida Initiative.

## **BEYOND MERIDA**

Upon taking office in 2006, Mexican President Calderon made combating drug trafficking and organized crime a top priority for his government.<sup>3</sup> The commitment of Mexican military forces and significant increases in budgetary resources clearly signaled his administration's intent to wage this war. The Calderon government's request for increased U.S. cooperation led to the bilateral development of the Merida Initiative. From FY2008 to FY2010, this \$1.5B aid package originally focused on fighting criminal organizations, strengthening the border, improving the rule of law, and fighting local crime and drug use. These original areas were then combined into three pillars: counter-narcotics and border security; public security and law enforcement; and institution building and the rule of law.<sup>4</sup> Of the three aid accounts supporting this initiative, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) received the bulk of the resources, \$1B and \$420M respectively. The third aid account, Economic Support Fund (ESF), received only \$50M across

the entire program.<sup>5</sup> The original Merida Initiative clearly focused on directly defeating drug traffickers and organized crime.

As the situation along the border has evolved, so have attitudes from both sides towards any follow on efforts to Merida. In Mexico, the military's lead in the counter drug war, while successful in some areas, has come at a price. Concerns over human rights abuses led the U.S. Congress to restrict 15% of the original law enforcement and military Merida funds, contingent on the State Department submitting requisite human rights progress reports. Congress actually withheld FY2008 and FY2009 funds while awaiting this report.<sup>6</sup> Statements by U.S. Representative Connie Mack to the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee compare the evolving threat to an insurgency and stress any follow on effort must contain comprehensive non-military interagency foundations, increased border resources, and rule of law training for pertinent Mexican agencies.<sup>7</sup>

Mexican attitudes towards Merida have shifted as well. "According to Mexico's Human Rights Commission (CNDH), complaints of human rights abuses by Mexico's Department of Defense increased from 182 in 2006 to 1,791 in 2009 before falling to 1,415 in 2010."<sup>8</sup> As a result, public attitude towards military led counter-drug operations is waning. Candidates from all parties are calling for a change, to include current President Calderon's. Specifically, on October 11 of this year, the 2006 Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (Party of the Democratic Revolution) or PRD presidential candidate, Andres Manuel Lopez, called for the de-militarization of our bilateral agenda while speaking to a U.S. think tank.<sup>9</sup> Santiago Creel Miranda, a PAN senator and presidential hopeful, stated he would establish a DEA equivalent in Mexico and move the main emphasis away from the military and return it to a law enforcement issue.<sup>10</sup>

Beyond Merida reflects the shift towards an indirect and long term approach to the problem. Beyond Merida's focus centers on four pillars: disrupting the operational capacity of organized crime; institutionalizing the rule of law in Mexico; Creating a "21<sup>st</sup> Century Border;" and building strong and resilient communities. Only one pillar addresses directly combating Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), while the other three stress solving the underlying issues contributing to the current environment. Most telling are the proposed appropriations and their aid accounts. While not yet approved, by FY2012 Beyond Merida zeroes the FMF account while increasing the ESF account three fold to \$33.3M.<sup>11</sup>

The nearly \$500M proposed for Beyond Merida shifts the focus away from military equipment, technology, and training and towards establishing conditions that would be considered hostile to TCOs. Pillar two sets conditions for Mexico to shift its main effort from the military to law enforcement. It addresses shortcomings in both law enforcement training and judiciary accountability. To be effective, the majority of this aid would be executed at the state level and below, where the bulk of law enforcement activities occur. Pillar three, while vague, clearly focuses on the border region and the six Mexican states adjacent to the U.S. To create the communities seen in pillar four's focus, its resources, again, must be executed locally by state and municipal governments. This regional and local aspect of Beyond Merida is critical when assessing any Mexican political impact.

## **MEXICAN NATIONAL POLITICS**

Three major political parties make up the significant portion of the Mexican political landscape. The Partido de la Revolucion Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party) or PRI was founded at the conclusion of the Mexican revolution in 1918. It was formed in an effort to



reduce the widespread violence seen during the revolution and the violence between parties that followed. It originated as a broad based, nationalistic party that included nearly every sector from Mexican society. Its initial success enabled it to take total control of all elements of the government and control them until their monolithic hold began to crack in 1998. While seen as broad based and responsive to its people, its methods of maintaining control were not always altruistic. Reports of corruption, intimidation, bribery, fraud, and other corrosive means were widespread during their 71 years of control.<sup>12</sup>

The party that finally broke the PRI's hold was the Partido de Accion Nacional (National Action Party) or PAN. Created in 1939, the PAN became the main, but impudent, opposition party that merely provided the PRI legitimacy for so called democratic elections. Over the years, it has become a center-right party, calling itself "humanist."<sup>13</sup> Tolerated by the PRI, this "loyal opposition" party never held a significant post throughout Mexico until its first gubernatorial victory in 1989.<sup>14</sup>

The PAN did not break the PRI's hold by itself. In late 1987, a group within the PRI sought to change the party's candidate selection process. They demanded candidates be chosen by popular election across the party, instead of allowing the current president to name his successor. Failing, these politically exiled individuals formed a coalition of leftist parties known initially known as the Frente Democratico Nacional (National Democratic Front) or FDN.<sup>15</sup> Over time, this party has transformed into the PRD, the third major political party on the national stage.

The first major test for a true multi-party election came during the national election in 1988. Both the PAN and PRD parties challenged the PRI for national control. After a significant delay and other irregularities in compiling the election results, the PRI candidate won.

However, the PRD and PAN candidates received 31% and 17% of the vote respectively.

Winning with 50% gave the PRI its slimmest victory to date.<sup>16</sup>

In the years leading up to the 2000 national election, the PRI lost its stranglehold on both governorships and the Chamber of Deputies. Opposition parties, primarily the PAN and PRD, worked together to achieve most of these victories. The 2000 election brought an end to the PRI's hold on the presidency when Vicente Fox Quesada won the election. It is important to note that he was a coalition candidate, with the PAN joining forces with another lesser party to achieve this victory.<sup>17</sup> It is also important to note that many in the international community considered these elections to be the most free and fair in Mexico's history.<sup>18</sup>

This set the stage for the last national election in 2006. Felipe Calderon, the PAN candidate, defeated his closest challenger by just 0.56%. The PRI candidate came in a distant third and ceded defeat. However, the PRD's second place finisher challenged the results. After supervising a recount, the Mexican Electoral Tribunal ruled unanimously that the victory was indeed valid and Felipe Calderon was to be president. The PRD candidate never acknowledged the decision.<sup>19</sup>

## 2012 MEXICAN ELECTION



(Figure 1 – Map of Current Mexican Governorships by Party<sup>20</sup>)

As the 2012 election approaches in Mexico, the political landscape is again changing. Several factors point to a reemergence of the PRI and their likely victory in the next presidential race. The first factor is the gubernatorial indicators. As seen in Figure 1, PRI governed states are in red, PAN in blue, and PRD in yellow. The overall dominance of PRI governors is self evident in this map. However, key victories in the past few months indicate a strong PRI performance, perhaps building momentum towards 2012. In this past July, three states, the State of Mexico, Coahuila, and Nayarit, concluded their gubernatorial elections. In all three states, the PRI was victorious. In both Coahuila and Nayarit, the PRI maintained control. This was especially important in the key border state of Coahuila where the victor is the brother of the

PRI's national president.<sup>21</sup> In November, the PRD led State of Michoacan will hold its state election. Current polling gives the PRI candidate 39% of the vote, 4% ahead of his nearest rival from the PRD, with the PAN placing third in the polls with 26%. This is significant since the PAN candidate is the current president's sister, Luis Maria Calderon.<sup>22</sup>

The State of Mexico's election results are particularly telling. With the state's physical location surrounding Mexico City, this race received national attention. Again the PRI maintained control of this state, but additional factors point to this election's national implications. The PRI candidate won decisively, receiving 62% of the overall vote. The PRD candidate received only 21%, and the PAN candidate came in a distant third with 17%. Many saw this PRI victory as a validation of the outgoing governor's policies and abilities. Enrique Pena Nieto, the outgoing governor, is currently the leading candidate in the national election.<sup>23</sup>

Current polling indicates Nieto owns a decisive lead. Central to his popularity is his perceived success against crime. Despite inconsistencies in his claims and statistics, he is effectively translating this success to the national stage.<sup>24</sup> As of August, Nieto leads all other possible challengers, to include any from the PRI party. In a race between Nieto and the other top candidates from the PAN and PRD, Nieto would receive 63% of the vote against the PRD and PAN candidates' 19% and 16% respectively.<sup>25</sup> When compared to the results of the 2006 election, this lead appears to be decisive.

With overall optimistic views concerning the economy and overall direction of the country,<sup>26</sup> crime, drugs, and violence remain the highest rated issue for Mexicans in the upcoming election.<sup>27</sup> Failing to capitalize on any successes in his war on TCOs is preventing President Calderon's party from gaining any ground against their PRI rivals. If Nieto can

continue to translate his perceived successes against crime to the national stage and the people believe he can tackle their top priorities, he will likely be the next Mexican president.

## **ANALYSIS**

The TCOs involved in Mexico did not like the Merida Initiative and will not like Beyond Merida. Their ongoing adaptations and increased violence make this clear. If they had their way, they would end this level of bilateral cooperation and return to the days before the Binational Drug Control Strategy of 1998. This period was characterized by limited enforcement and an obvious working relationship between the government and the criminal organizations. A single party political system was a critical enabler of this relationship. Perhaps the greatest indicator of the upcoming election's effect on Beyond Merida is not who wins the election, but the election itself. The 2012 election will be the third national election in Mexico with a true multi-party ticket.

Several quality, politically viable parties provide a layer of protection against corruption and graft. A genuine choice dilutes TCO influence. They no longer have the option of simple bribery to gain and maintain influence. Several viable candidates, involved in daily affairs of their district, make straightforward bribery schemes too costly and complex. While the financial resources of the TCOs are vast, it is unlikely that they would have the patience and local capability to place several state or nationally known candidates on their payroll. The matured election infrastructure, both technical and non-technical, along with a matured free-press also protect against TCO influence. Bribing large amounts of election workers and reporters is highly unlikely.

Placing all of their money on the candidate they believe is the likely winner poses risks that require careful consideration. Financing one candidate places him or her at risk for corruption charges during the campaign. According to a recent poll last August, corruption ranks fifth among top issues behind crime, cartel related violence, illegal drugs, and the economy.<sup>28</sup> While corruption charges played significant rolls in the previous defeats of the PRI in the 2000 and 2006 presidential campaigns, the Mexican population's focus has shifted. Currently, no national candidate has made significant charges of TCO collusion against any other candidate. Financing one candidate places the overall investment at risk, equating it to a form of betting at the horse track. While the TCOs undoubtedly have a political line of operation, it is unlikely that they would venture into the realm of betting their future and money on politics. An unintended consequence of this self-policing system is that TCOs may resort directly to extortion or other more extreme forms of violence to influence politicians, elections, and their resulting policies.

Reducing TCO influence on candidates and elections directly affects Beyond Merida. As stated, the TCOs would prefer the Mexican government not coordinate their actions with nor receive additional counter-narcotics resources from the U.S. Influencing national policy to negate or end Beyond Merida would be an efficient use of TCO money. Misdirecting or stealing these resources at the regional (border) or local (state and below) levels through corrupt politicians is another efficient use of resources. The quality, multi-party system, while not preventing all corrosive influence, insulates the process from much of it.

Beyond Merida's evolution provides another indicator of the election's effect. Mexico's history of invasions and violence can be seen in their constitution. Mexico takes sovereign threats very seriously; strong constitutional restrictions are in place to protect against any form of military or commercial intrusion. The Mexican Senate must approve any foreign military

operation within the borders of Mexico, to include trainers, advisors, and combined training exercises. As the Mexican public has never fully supported the employment of their military in the counter drug war, they also saw the militaristic nature of the original Merida Initiative as a potential threat. With over a third of total aid located in the FMF account, it could clearly be perceived as a potential threat to Mexican sovereignty.

The reduced military focus of Beyond Merida plays to the PRI's position of eventually removing the military from the lead of the counter TCO fight. Accepting and supporting aid in the form of law enforcement / judiciary and economic support allows the PRI to match words and deeds. Beyond Merida becomes a tangible example of their commitment to reducing their military's role in the counter drug fight while maintaining the fight overall.

Beyond Merida also becomes a vehicle to assist the PRI in breaking from their past. Supporting a foreign aid package focused on the counter TCO fight demonstrates their commitment to their own people as well as the international community. While not as aggressive as previous aid packages, Beyond Merida still takes the fight to the TCOs while supporting key economic and infrastructure development. Beyond Merida also allows the PRI to develop deeper bilateral ties with the U.S. and bridge the distrust created by the 1998 Binational Drug Control Strategy.

The type and focus of aid that Beyond Merida provides plays to the political advantage of the PRI, thus reducing the chance that they will have any negative impact on its future. As discussed earlier, the aid appropriations projected for Beyond Merida focus on law enforcement and judiciaries, border security, and local economic support. To have the greatest impact and best efficiency, this aid must be pushed down from the national level. State and local leaders are in the best position to execute this aid.

Each state in Mexico has its own constitution, judiciary, law enforcement, and congress. Mexico is truly a federation of states. The complexity this creates in providing unity of effort among law enforcement agencies alone is well documented. As national leadership tries to shift the military out of the lead and place the main effort back to law enforcement and judiciaries, extensive resources must be focused to local and state functions. While federal law enforcement would receive its fair share, sheer numbers alone dictate that the bulk of the INCLE aid account, nearly \$540M,<sup>29</sup> would go to the appropriate border region states and their subordinate agencies.

The bulk of remaining Beyond Merida resources, in support of pillars 3 and 4, would also need to be pushed towards regional and local levels. Pillar 3, Building a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Border, will not see the majority of its aid pushed to southern areas of Mexico. The six states along the border are the obvious recipients of this focus. Facilitating local security, enforcing immigration, facilitating legal commercial travel, and enabling cross-border trade require substantial investment at the state and local level. Significant technology and infrastructure investments must take place along the border region to achieve the goals of Pillar 3. Pillar 4, building strong and resilient communities, will likely see most of its economic aid pushed towards regions other than the border. However, even though increasing threefold, this economic aid is still the smallest of the three aid accounts.

A half a billion dollars in aid is significant, and the bulk of it is focused on the border region. As seen in Figure 1, the PRI politically controls four of the six border states. Of these four, three will not have gubernatorial elections prior to 2015. In the west, the State of Baja California holds elections in 2013, a year after the presidential election. Current polling is limited; however, the PRI has maintained control of Tijuana's mayoral position and will likely make gains in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. This momentum creates the possibility



of the PRI politically controlling the vast majority of the border region well beyond the current appropriation requests supporting Beyond Merida.

The ability to control, guide, and influence nearly \$500M in foreign aid to their growing power bloc along the border makes any negative effect from the PRI on Beyond Merida unlikely. Abruptly ending or interfering with this aid does not support any form of political patronage. While outright graft and corruption have reduced since 2000, political patronage is a reality in Mexico. Supporting and strengthening state and local PRI led institutions with foreign aid is an opportunity that the national PRI organization will likely immediately seize upon. It is possible, with the de-militarization of Beyond Merida, the PRI may directly and publicly support it.

### **COUNTERARGUMENT**

With these factors in mind, the possibility of the PRI denouncing or refusing to support Beyond Merida is unlikely. However, there are ways in which the PRI could have a profoundly negative effect on the program. Prior to 2000, the PRI controlled Mexico for 71 years. Corruption was one of the methods they used very effectively to support this long run of power. Despite efforts to break from their past, they have a long history of criminal patronage.

The U.S. Congress will place conditions on Merida aid, as evidenced by their previous withholding of aid for human rights issues in 2009. In current testimony, Representative Mack has criticized both the Merida Initiative and Beyond Merida for a lack of accountability, implementation, and metrics.<sup>30</sup> Congress is also pressing for additional accountability in the wake of the Fast and Furious fallout that continues today. In light of these facts, it is likely that the U.S. Congress will place extensive controls and conditions on this aid's implementation and execution.

If the PRI returns to its old ways and crosses the line from political patronage to criminal patronage, the U.S. Congress will likely withhold as much funding as they can until they are satisfied with corrective measures. They will not tolerate the siphoning of any form of aid purely for political or criminal gain. The freezing of one aid account will likely lead to the freezing of all aid accounts supporting Beyond Merida, producing second and third order effects not related to the original transgression.

Prior to 2000, the PRI developed deep ties with TCOs. The GAO's assessment of the 1998 Binational Drug Control Strategy provides evidence of this. From FY2000 through FY2006 \$397M achieved little improvement in drug seizures and corruption hindered bilateral efforts.<sup>31</sup> Despite efforts to break with this past and move forward, this may not be as easy as they hope. Last June, the Mexican military arrested the PRI Mayor of Tijuana, Jorge Hank Rhon. Hank had fought off corruption charges for years, however, during the arrest federal forces found over 88 weapons along with other evidence indicating TCO collusion. Federal authorities released Hank from custody and returned him to Baja California to face state weapons charges. A very flamboyant figure, Hank continues to fight this case very publicly.<sup>32</sup>

This negative publicity makes breaking with their past very hard for the PRI. Whether true or not, this is one of the few corruption cases presently playing out on the national stage. It is not good press for the PRI. With the congressional controls likely to surround Beyond Merida, this perceived relationship between the PRI and the TCOs could again lead to the suspension of aid.

Catastrophic success of the PRI must be considered as well. With their momentum building, it is possible that the PRI could gain super majorities in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies along with the presidency. With one party in control, the other parties could be

marginalized to the point of ineffectiveness. We could see the beginning of a return to the “old ways” seen in the PRI’s previous 71 years prior to 2000. With the increased monetary resources of the TCOs, the PRI may make the choice to side with them instead of supporting Beyond Merida. In exchange for money, local services, and reduced violence, the PRI could offer the TCOs a permissive environment from which to conduct their operations. Done covertly at first, this support to the TCOs could take place while accepting Beyond Merida aid, allowing the PRI to build political capital from both sides.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

Corruption poses a significant threat to the effectiveness of Beyond Merida. Both by the actual loss, theft, or misdirection of resources and potential actions the U.S. Congress may take in response to these actions. Actively identifying and preventing corruption should be an integral part of Beyond Merida itself.

Techniques currently being developed by CJIAF-Shafafiyat (Transparency) in Afghanistan begin to address these challenges. The task force combines network and nodal analysis with forensic financial analysis to identify criminal patronage networks and determine the appropriate course of action. While some nodes may warrant kinetic attacks, many are either collected against for potential prosecution or isolated from future financial opportunities as part of the aid package. Using these techniques in support of Beyond Merida may assist in identifying TCO infiltration of government agencies, or may simply identify political players overstepping their authorities. Either way, the techniques strengthen the political viability of Beyond Merida by directly supporting Pillars 1 and 2, disrupting TCOs and institutionalizing the rule of law. However, these operational and theater level techniques are currently led by the

military and executed by interagency partners. Adapting these techniques to apply in a truly combined, strategic and political environment will be challenging.

Congress has expressed concerns over ways to measure the effectiveness of Beyond Merida. Accountability and implementation are always a challenge. Without clear guidance and intent, clear measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are difficult to develop. The clarity of Beyond Merida is still in development, but there are ways to begin developing MOEs and MOPs.

The original Merida Initiative outlined in Senate Report 110-35 to the Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 2007 contained detailed data in support of the original appropriations. Dollar amounts, equipment, lead agencies, and program descriptions all prescribed in detail how and where the original monies were to be spent. As Congress approves Beyond Merida's appropriations and makes them public, detailed analysis can be done line by line. Individual programs will dictate appropriate MOPs. However, since the bulk of Beyond Merida is not military focused, the challenge will be in convening the proper combined and interagency partners to provide this input. Once developed and combined, the MOPs can be grouped by similarities and MOEs developed to assess their overall effectiveness. This bottom up approach is not perfect. However, this process can begin to chip away at the complexity of assessment and implementation of Beyond Merida. This process could also provide critical information required to emplace some of the anti-corruption measures mentioned earlier.

## **CONCLUSION**

Several factors combine to show that the Mexican election in 2012 will have little or no effect on Beyond Merida. The election itself firmly entrenches a viable multi-party political

landscape, providing inherent protection from TCO influence and political corruption. The transformation of the aid package from a military equipment and technology focus to rule of law and economic support focus makes Beyond Merida much more palatable to the Mexican public. The assistance poses much less of a threat to their sovereignty than the original Merida Initiative. As the PRI takes control of the GOM next year, this bilateral aid package plays to their advantage. First, it provides them an opportunity to break with their past on both a national and international stage, showing their commitment to fight against TCOs. Second, it enables them to begin transforming their fight from a military centric operation to a law enforcement stance, matching their stated political objectives. And finally, it also allows them to use this support to provide patronage to loyal and key areas of the country that are vital to their political strength and survival, all while not violating Beyond Merida's objectives and intent. Clearly, the combination of millions in foreign aid and a strong national PRI create the opportunity for corruption. Adapting current anti-corruption techniques and establishing clearing MOEs and MOPs for the entire aid package will limit these opportunities, and U.S. Congressional oversight requirements will likely be met.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Senate. *Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: Nominations*. Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, July 28, 2011, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/880186365?accountid=322>, (accessed September 23, 2011).

<sup>3</sup> Ribando Seelke, Clare and Finklea, Kristin, *U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond* (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2011), 8.

<sup>4</sup> Senate. *Report to the Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations: The Merida Initiative: Guns, Drugs, and Friends*, 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, 1<sup>st</sup> sess., S. Prt. 110-35, 51.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 34.

<sup>7</sup> House. “House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Hearing: Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution of Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance,” Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc. September 13, 2011. <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/mac091311.pdf> (accessed September 23, 2011).

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